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LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY OF THE OCEANS
JOHN NORTON MOORE*
It is a privilege and a pleasure to meet with this distinguished
group to share a few thoughts on the direction of United States
oceans policy and the prognosis for the Third United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea. If we were to step back and view the
earth from outer space, the most distinctive geographic feature
would be that more than two-thirds of the surface of the earth is
covered by oceans. In fact, from a space perspective, Earth would
more appropriately be called Oceana, as the watery planet. Every
nation has a significant stake in achieving an ordering of that two-
thirds of the surface on the earth which will lead to an avoidance of
conflict, a fair distribution of the resources of the area, an efficient
utilization of the resources of the oceans, and an intelligent protec-
tion of these areas.
But although every nation has a stake in the oceans, the
United States has perhaps the largest stake. This is so in part be-
cause as a superpower with major defense commitments we must
honor those commitments on a global basis crossing many of the
world's oceans; because the United States, as a major technological
leader in the world, simply has a broad range of specific oceans
interests around the world; and because the United States is one of
the major coastal nations of the world. In fact, the state of Alaska
alone has a significantly longer coastline than a majority of the na-
tions in the world.
If we were to look at some of the specific stakes that the United
States has in the oceans, certainly we would focus on the defense
and security needs of the United States. Unlike the case with re-
spect to the Soviet Union, the principal allies of the United States
are located across the oceans. Re-supply of Israel, for example, re-
quires the crossing of a vast ocean area. If one shifts from the ques-
tion of support for our allies, the whole issue of bringing in the
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resources that are needed for the industrial economy of the United
States also requires heavy dependence on the oceans. Looking at
oil alone, we import by sea over forty percent of the hydrocarbons
used by the United States. The United States has relied increas-
ingly on the naval arm of the strategic triad, the SSBN subma-
rines, as a stable deterrent in the overall strategic equation.
If we shift to the question of trade, the United States, with ap-
proximately ten percent of its economy based almost directly on
global trade, and with its European allies with about thirty to forty
percent of their economies based on global trade, is very heavily
dependent on the merchant marine and the ability to use the oceans
to move that trade.
If we look to hydrocarbons from the oceans, the estimate is
that about forty percent of the global potential is going to be lo-
cated under salt water. To keep it in perspective in terms of our
own claims versus others, approximately ninety-five percent of that
potential is likely to be off the shores of other nations. Though we
have a significant continental margin, our margin is approximately
five percent of the worldwide margin.
If we look to the question of the living resources, both the
coastal fisheries and the distant water fisheries, we believe the
fisheries off the United States coast which are about twenty-five
percent of the entire world's potential, should at maximum sustain-
able yield bear something on the order of 100 million plus dollars
per year on a continuing harvesting basis. We also have a signifi-
cant stake in distant water fishing as the sleek tuna boats in the San
Diego harbor can attest.
We have a significant interest in access to the manganese nod-
ules of the deep ocean floor. These nodules look like lumps of coal
and contain what we believe are commercially attractive quantities
of copper, nickel, cobalt, and manganese. Industry feels quite
strongly that if permitted to move forward with deep seabed min-
ing, by the year 1990 or 1995 they could supply most of the needs of
the United States for all these minerals and reverse the traditional
import balance of nickel, cobalt, and manganese.
We have a significant stake in the environment of the oceans
on a global basis. Ultimately we have such a stake because the
oceans may be a critical part of the overall ecosystem in terms of
the generation of oxygen and the entire life cycle of the earth. But
long before we get to that point, we must avoid the kinds of
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problems that we have seen with heavy metals in Japan, or here at
home with kepone or simply pollution of our beaches.
We have a significant interest in blue-water oceanographic re-
search on a global basis. The efforts of the Glomar Explorer and
our own oceanographic centers have enabled us to make a very sig-
nificant breakthrough in understanding the theory of plate tectonics
and sea floor spreading which could be of great importance for
mankind.
And finally, something that we do not frequently think about
but which may be our most significant stake in the ocean is the
resolution of political disputes, that is, to bring nations together to
resolve problems such as the Chile-Equador-Peru tuna seizures that
have been so well-known here in San Diego, or our boundary dis-
putes with the Canadians. We also have an important political
stake in creating a legal regime which will provide the stability of
expectations required for the investments that will have to take
place in the oceans and finally to have the kinds of mechanisms in
place to avoid conflict and to reach peaceful settlement when con-
flict does arise.
As Secretary Habib was making his superb presentation last
night, I could not help thinking that the Law of the Sea negotia-
tions and our ocean interests were perhaps the paradigm of every-
thing that he was discussing as to the trends in modern diplomacy;
the complexity of the domestic policy process, the need to develop
consensus with many different constituent units, the shift toward
multilateralism and dealing with truly global problems, and finally
the need for optimism.
Now, if those are some of the interests which the United States
has at stake in the oceans, what are some of the significant trends
that are threatening those interests and indeed the common inter-
ests in the oceans? I think there are at least three very important
trends to be taken into account. The first is the very substantial
Soviet naval and oceans buildup since the end of World War II. At
that time, the Soviet Union had a very small and coastal-oriented
oceans defense force. Since World War II they have been engaged
in a major buildup of ocean strength. Soviet writings indicate they
understand well the importance of the oceans. Indeed, these writ-
ings read like a latter-day Alfred Thayer Mahan on seapower. At
the present time, the Soviet navy has more combattant vessels than
the United States in every major category of vessels except aircraft
carriers. I do not think it is fruitful to get into a ship-counting exer-
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cise or to believe that it is the most sophisticated way to analyze
naval strength, but I think I can report accurately that even the
optimists concede that the United States would be very severely
pressed to protect sea lanes in the Pacific beyond Hawaii and that
we would be in one serious naval battle to protect the sea lanes to
Europe during some kind of sustained NATO emergency. And if
you shift to the views of the pessimists, Admiral Zumwalt, a former
Chief of Naval Operations, implies that the United States would
lose a war at sea with the Soviet Union today. I am not in the camp
of the pessimists, but wherever you may be, one has to take account
of a set of trends in naval power over the past decade that have
been against the United States.
Soviet ocean strength goes beyond simply the naval equation.
They are having a major buildup in almost every other area of
ocean strength. Their merchant marine now carries more than
sixty percent of Soviet cargos and it is being expanded at a rapid
rate. In comparison, our merchant marine carries less than five
percent of United States cargos; during the year of the wheat deal,
it was said that the Soviet Union carried more United States im-
ports and exports in bulk cargo trades than the United States car-
ried in its own flag vessels.
The Soviet Union is having a major buildup in Arctic capabili-
ties with the first surface vessel excursion to the North Pole. They
have significantly outspent us in the Arctic area in the past decade.
They have more marine oceanographic scientists and are turning
them out more rapidly. They have a larger fleet of fundamental
oceanographic research ships. And one can go on and on.
The purpose of this comparison is not to indicate that a num-
bers comparison is an intelligent way to approach the issues. You
may discover, for example, that to the Soviet Union, fisheries are a
cheaper form of protein than other forms of inefficient agriculture
on land. In fact, it is highly intelligent for them to have a major
effort in the fisheries area where it does not make the same sense for
us. So I am not seeking to predict doom by citing these figures, but
merely to indicate significant trends that we must follow closely.
Now, short of a major confrontation with the Soviet Union in
the oceans area, I think the most serious adverse trend is that of
claims by coastal nations unilaterally to extend their jurisdiction
into the world's oceans. This trend has been unmistakable, prima-
rily since World War II. There have been claims to control transit
rights through and over straits used for international navigation.
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During the Yom Kippur War, for example, Spain sought to deny
over-flight rights by the United States through the Strait of Gibral-
ter and to claim that the Strait was merely a territorial sea area
controlled by Spain. That is merely indicative of many such claims
by strait-states to control rights through straits. A group of mid-
ocean archipelagic nations have asserted claims to draw straight
base line systems around the outermost points of their outermost
islands and to call all of the areas within that either internal waters,
territorial sea, or some other form of restrictive national regime. To
give you the most extreme example, our own trust territories of Mi-
cronesia sought to persuade the delegation to go along with declar-
ing Micronesia an archipelago, which would have drawn these
closing lines connecting the outermost points of their outermost is-
lands. Such lines would have enclosed about 240 square miles of
land territory and an area of the Pacific Ocean that would be
greater than the continental United States and Alaska.
Unilateral claims have also been made in terms of environ-
mental protection and "special areas." Sometimes these claims
may run cover for national controls over navigation. For example,
in 1970 the Canadians declared an Arctic Pollution Control Zone
that would have given them nearly complete control over all navi-
gation within one hundred miles of Canada within the area delim-
ited. There have been expansive claims to a territorial sea with, of
course, some of the Latins being in the forefront with claims of 200
nautical miles in which there would be no right of submerged
transit, no right of overflight, and one suspects through time a vari-
ety of claims even challenging military activities and the right of
naval maneuvers in those areas.
Recently, there have been more explicit claims to "military
boundary zones" and other areas which would prohibit military ac-
tivity. For example, North Korea, in responding to our own 200-
mile fishery zone, adopted a 200-mile fishery zone plus, for good
measure, a 50-mile "military boundary zone" in which even com-
mercial shipping would be prohibited without the consent of North
Korea. There have been expansive claims to continental shelves,
with India, for example, claiming an area of shelf in the Indian
Ocean that goes out over a thousand miles and which would turn
the Indian Ocean into an Indian Ocean. There have been claims to
prevent exploitation of the deep seabed by turning it into the com-
mon heritage of mankind in ways that would place it under control
of a monopoly international organization controlled by the devel-
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oping nations. Now I do not mean to attack the reasonable and
fine permutations of the concept of the "common heritage of man-
kind," but I do wish to indicate that this claim also fits into a
broader pattern of claims restricting national oceans uses.
Let us now shift to yet another significant trend that must con-
cern us in the oceans; it is an area that you have already discussed
extensively - the North-South dialogue and the new economic or-
der. As it applies to the oceans - as is the case elsewhere - it
would be a mistake to try an oversimplistic labelling of this rather
amorphous set of trends because it really includes a variety of dif-
ferent things. In some of its manifestations it is a reasonable set of
concerns of producing nations to free themselves from the worst
kinds of extreme market fluctuations in the market economy. It is
also a set of reasonable demands in some of its permutations based
strongly on the Judeo-Christian tradition of help for those who are
in fact underprivileged and who do not have the kinds of resources
to feed their populations or to obtain development. On the other
hand, the new economic order, particularly as it has been felt in the
oceans, has sometimes been a cover for special interest pleading or
for claims that would lead to vastly inefficient utilizations of ocean
resources. For example, it is one of the great shams of all time that
the extreme coastal nations of the world have been able initially to
convince developing countries that a coastalist expansion of juris-
diction is in the interest of developing countries of the world. If one
looks at the reality, one will see that some of the principal benefi-
ciaries are the United States, the Soviet Union, other developed na-
tions, and that the trend, as one would suspect, has been reflective
of special interest pleading on the part of some very clever middle
rank coastal nations.
I do not mean to continue to pick on the Canadians because, as
our neighbors to the north and a nation with a major ocean stake,
they have been leaders in seeking a new convention. But, on the
other hand, one has to take note of the fact that, in efforts to extend
the continental margin beyond 200 miles, we estimate that
economically fifty percent of the entire world hydrocarbon poten-
tial of that area may be Canadian. They of course are in the fore-
front of that trend.
You also find a concern in this rhetoric of the new economic
order for state centrist models; for example, the idea of the enter-
prise which is to be a centrist model of development on behalf of
the international community. The issue there is not really one of
6
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2 [1979], Art. 16
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol9/iss2/16
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
sharing and the maximum rate of return to developing countries -
it has not been approached in that fashion. I think a very excellent
case can be made that a licensing system in which any nation or
firm is free to mine the deep seabed subject to certain licensing re-
strictions and a significant tax which would go to developing coun-
tries would in fact generate higher revenues for developing
counties.
Let us turn from trends threatening ocean interests to the
United States response. I am not a specialist in the naval issues, so
I will not discuss our response to those issues, except to say that for
me the most important aspects of the question are really what hap-
pens over a fairly long period of time; that is, not this year on the
issue of the nuclear carrier versus another conventional carrier or
precisely what happens next year, but the question of the trend
through a ten to twenty-year period of time. It is a question of the
general levels of defense expenditures on the part of the Soviet
Union and the United States, which in turn are likely to be highly
dependent on the general economic strength of the United States
vis-a -vis the Soviet Union. Those are the kinds of long term con-
cerns that we must particularly focus on. It is the big picture that
counts, and not simply the details of the moment.
But if we shift to the other trends, those of the claims to extend
jurisdiction unilaterally, and the North-South permutations that
are closely associated with that, I think there are some things we
can say about what our strategy ought to be in dealing with those
problems and dealing with them responsibly; not simply in a nega-
tive sense, but in an affirmative way that provides the kinds of in-
centives for others that Secretary Habib mentioned last night and
which I believe are indeed a very important part of a successful and
lasting negotiation.
In examining the spectrum of strategies we see they range from
unilateralism - the kind of issues that Len Theberge mentioned to
us - to complete multilateralism. It would be a question of mak-
ing our own oceans claims, of limited bilateral agreements, limited
multilateral agreements or some mix of those to deal with the prob-
lem, or a comprehensive oceans agreement which itself would have
to be supplemented by a variety of limited multilateral, bilateral,
and perhaps some unilateral actions. And as we did that within the
National Security Council, one answer emerged that was very clear
to me. For the United States, multilateralism - successful multi-
lateralism with a good outcome and a good treaty that reasonably
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protected our oceans interest - was substantially preferable to any
other kind of alternative, particularly to unilateral approaches.
Now why is that? Well there are a number of reasons that make
sense both theoretically and in terms of what we have been seeing
happening in the oceans. One is that if the threat is unilateralism
on the part of others, how in the world does one control unilateral-
ism by making a set of unilateral claims of one's own? You simply
cannot limit the other fellow's unilateral claim by saying, "Look, I
claim a 200-mile fishery zone, therefore you ought to claim only a
200-mile fishery zone." The principle that is likely to stand out in
that example is that if you have made a unilateral claim over the
oceans for things you believe are in your national interest to con-
trol, others can make similar unilateral judgments. It is unilateral-
ism itself that is endorsed by that decision, and that is precisely
what happens. Since we have the broadest and most complex range
of oceans interests - the other fellow's claims being much more
simplistic - our interests systematically suffer around the world
while his are protected. The process also leaves out the landlocked
and geographically disadvantaged states who have no way of mak-
ing unilateral claims and who in many respects strongly support
United States oceans interests. They are for freedom of navigation,
for example, and have no reason to see navigation or marine scien-
tific research restricted on the world's oceans.
Even leaving aside the landlocked and geographically disad-
vantaged states, when one looks at the pattern of coastal states, one
discovers that more than a majority of all the coastal states of the
world become totally zone-locked before reaching a 200-mile area.
What this means is that when one gets to about 180 miles in the
world's oceans, there is a break-even point in which there is abso-
lutely no further gain for a majority of those coastal nations of the
world because they have run up against someone else's oceans
boundary or their 200-mile claim, or whatever it may be. From a
theoretical standpoint, it is not surprising that one would expect to
do better in a reasonable multilateral conference that brings these
groups together than in a pattern of unilateralism in which the
claims of the most extreme claimants become the leaders in the
rhetoric of the Group of 77.
Although we have arrived at efforts at multilateral agreement
as the best strategy, if one looks back over the history of United
States oceans policy, one realizes that our policy has been in fact a
mixture; we perhaps have not always acted in our best interests in
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the oceans area. The Truman Proclamation in 1945 is cited repeat-
edly as the beginning wedge for unilateral oceans claims. It was
strongly urged by the Interior Department, and in that case there
was no violation of international law; there was no controlling
treaty violated and it was accepted very quickly by almost every
nation in the world. In 1958 and 1960, we resumed the multilateral
course in the First and Second United Nations Conferences on the
Law of the Sea which led to four reasonably good conventions on
oceans law that continue very substantially to govern oceans law
today, although there were a number of significant omissions and
failures. The 1960 Conference was unable to agree on the maxi-
mum breadth of a territorial sea. Similarly, there was never any
definitive agreement reached on the outer limits of coastal state
fishery and resource jurisdiction. In the interim between 1960 and
1970, the failure to reach agreement on the maximum breadth of a
territorial sea, the problems associated with the emergence of newer
states claiming that "we want a share in developing this new law,"
and a whole series of new problems like deep seabed mining and
the emergence of environmental issues on which all four Geneva
Conventions give only passing mention - all of these problems -
came together. Between 1970 and 1973, we had a series of meetings
in something called the Ad Hoc Seabed Committee which initially
focused on the question of a regime for manganese nodule mining
in areas beyond national jurisdiction, but which ended up being a
preparatory effort over three years for a comprehensive conference
on the law of the sea. That Conference held its first session in 1973;
it has now completed seven sessions and its eighth session will be
held in Geneva in March of 1979.
One hears a great many varying assessments of the work of the
Third United Nations Conference. On the one hand, you will hear
some say that the materials contained in this Informal Composite
Negotiating Text (ICNT), which is roughly the work of the Confer-
ence plus some other materials, are very poor; someone said to me
that it had all of the lyrical qualities of the Manhattan telephone
directory with none of its accuracy. I think that is an overly pessi-
mistic perception. My own feeling is that about ninety to ninety-
five percent of the work of the Conference has been completed in a
manner that is satisfactory for United States oceans interests and
for the common interest in general. That includes agreement on a
maximum breadth of a territorial sea to twelve nautical miles,
which is rather unheard of if you remember the strength of the
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Latin push for the 200-mile territorial sea. By "consensus" on this I
am talking about a behind-the-scenes conference leadership con-
sensus of what that treaty is going to contain, as well as the article
that is now in the treaty. That does not mean that every nation will
accept the idea. There has been agreement on a twenty-four mile
contiguous zone; there is agreement on the question of transit rights
through and over straits used for international navigation; an im-
proved regime of innocent passage in the territorial sea that is both
a more definite and objective regime and a regime that better pro-
tects the marine environment. The question of mid-ocean archipe-
lagic nations has been resolved with a restriction on the kinds of
claims that could be made to a reasonable limitation, again with the
full transit rights through, over, and under very broad archipelagic
sea lanes. There has been agreement on a 200-mile economic zone
with essentially every article worked out, although there are still a
few problems in this area. That would mean coastal state resource
jurisdiction over coastal resources out to 200 miles as well as conti-
nental margin resources. There is agreement upon a basic frame-
work for continental margin jurisdiction that would either extend
to 200 miles or, where a nation has a margin that goes beyond 200
miles, to the outer edge of the continental margin. The framework
includes revenue-sharing for developing countries beginning at the
200-mile mark. As we will see, there is still an unresolved question
as to what the outer edge of the continental margin means.
There is a rather extraordinary chapter on protection of the
marine environment. I say extraordinary not because it is every-
thing our environmentalists would have preferred (nor could any of
us objectively say it was everything we wanted), but because it is a
stronger set of environmental guarantees than we have ever had
before in oceans law. At the same time, these articles resolved the
most difficult of the environmental problems - the vessel source
pollution problem - in ways that protect navigational freedom.
There is an extraordinary set of provisions on compulsory dispute
settlement, which, I believe, is quite flexible and which has gained
the strong support of the Soviet Union. And again, this is some-
thing - as those of you who have worked with the Soviets in many
of these conferences know - that is a fairly recent departure for the
Soviet Union; I can tell you that they have gone beyond even their
sort of reluctant acceptance of dispute settlement in other areas
when it comes to law of the sea.
Now if you look to the issues remaining - the negative side of
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the law of the sea ledger at the present time - there are really only
between eight and twelve significant political issues that remain to
be resolved. In my judgment, essentially all of those can fall rap-
idly into place if the most serious of all, the deep seabed mining
problem, is resolved. Before getting to the mining problem, let me
just quickly mention a couple of the remaining issues: the charac-
ter of the economic zone, which, most importantly, is really an issue
of the interface between coastal state resource jurisdiction and
navigational freedom; the question of the outer limit of the conti-
nental margin - how it will be determined; the problem of land-
locked and geographically disadvantaged states' access to the
fisheries in neighboring economic zones; the question of the protec-
tion of cetaceans and conservation of marine mammals; the issue of
the comprehensiveness of the dispute settlement system, particu-
larly as it applies to the economic zone; the question of marine sci-
entific research in the economic zone; and a whole set of issues
surrounding the final articles that have not yet been discussed
meaningfully. These last issues include such important things as
how many states have to sign before the Convention becomes bind-
ing or before it comes into force; even more important is the prob-
lem of a package - where are reservations to be permitted if at all
in an overall treaty which may contain more than 300 articles in a
comprehensive set of oceans issues. And there are other problems
as well. But I think that all of these can be resolved if and when we
can solve the question of deep seabed mining.
There are several polar positions on seabed mining. The ex-
treme Group of 77 position was for a single operating monopoly to
mine deep seabeds on a socialist state centrist model. The initial
developed countries position led by the United States was that
there should be a licensing system in the seabed area in which firms
would, subject to environmental regulations made by the interna-
tional authority and other reasonable regulations, be free to mine
and then pay a significant portion of the revenues to an interna-
tional authority for distribution to developing countries. Over the
years these positions have evolved into a fairly tenuous and uncer-
tain framework for compromise about something called a "parallel
system," or what I prefer to call a "balanced development system,"
in which one half of the area is based on the model of the enterprise
and the other half on an assured access system. The key to having
it work is a provision to the effect that every time a firm wants to go
over on the assured access side of the system, they must put up two
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sites, not knowing which site they will get - the enterprise selects
the site and then keeps the other in a bank for its own operations on
the enterprise track. And at the present time the extremely detailed
and complex negotiations are proceeding in this framework. We
have made a series of very forthright and I believe forthcoming
proposals on the enterprise side of the system for mandatory tech-
nology transfer, mandatory financing of the first operation of the
system on the enterprise side, and fairly great freedoms in the way
the enterprise would operate on this side of the system. In turn, my
own feeling is that we are going to have to get very clear assured
access on the other half of the system; if we do not there is virtually
no chance of Senate advice and consent to a law of the sea treaty.
And at the present time we do not have that in the text' I think the
issue to watch will be the clarity with which the "assured access"
side of the equation evolves.
As an overall reaction to where UNCLOS III is at the present
time, I feel something like the President of the University of Chi-
cago who, when asked whether the University was a great univer-
sty, replied, "No, but it is the best there is." The Law of the Sea
Conference is not only the best there is, it is the only game in town
in terms of optimal ways of protecting United States oceans inter-
ests. Now that does not mean we do not have fall-back options;
that does not mean that others might not suffer a great deal more
than we if there is a failure. It is merely to recognize that if we can
promote a successful comprehensive treaty, it is in our national in-
terest to do so.
Let me conclude by discussing very briefly some recommenda-
tions for United States policy in the oceans. I think the first and
most important thing is for us to recognize honestly that we need a
foreign policy for the oceans. And that is not something that is
obvious or something that we have ever had in a sense of a con-
scious, coherent policy. Rather, oceans policy has tended to be
made either on an ad hoc basis by setting up a negotiating group
for a conference or on a country-by-country basis as when a Peru-
vian tuna seizure crisis emerges. So I think the starting point is to
recognize that there are a range of issues that are coherent and that
require more than a country-by-country type of uncoordinated re-
sponse.
The second recommendation is to recognize very clearly our
foreign policy stake in the oceans - the international relations side
of the issue; here the consistent problem that we have had is that
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over and over we think of ourselves as a coastal state. And if you
look at the whole history of congressional involvement, particularly
in this, it is a coastal congressional effort; it is those concerned with
extending jurisdiction to 200 miles in a fishery zone without worry-
ing too much about whether we violate our treaty obligations or
about what happens to us off the shores of North Korea or other
parts of the world until something happens and hence is too late.
Part of the problem here, I think, has been that the executive
branch has not been the agency with leadership in oceans policy. It
has only been recently that we have had any kind of bureau of
oceans even in the State Department and indeed that was fought
until Senator Pell finally mandated the creation of an oceans bu-
reau.
Another aspect of our oceans policy is that we should be will-
ing to stay the course in the Law of the Sea Negotiations - to be a
calm sustaining influence underpinning the United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea. We should seek to avoid a rhetoric
of eminent conference failure at the very next session if we cannot
reach agreement. At home, we must be patient and understand the
nature of the complexities and the long term nature of the process
required. Just comparing it to 1958, for example, the International
Law Commission began work in the early 1950's; it was not until
1958 that we agreed upon the four Geneva Conventions, and we
even went to 1960 with another conference on the territorial sea.
So there was a period of at least ten years required for simple
agreement with fewer countries. It was not until about 1970 that we
started the current exercise meaningfully, and we are not yet ten
years from there. If you look at the SALT process, it is significantly
longer than UNCLOS III as a process up until the present. So I
think we have to get over the unrealistic notions that you can pres-
sure cook this kind of enormously complex treaty overnight. It
cannot be done. It takes a long time and it is in our interest to
persevere and get a good agreement.
At the same time I think frankly that the United States is going
to have to toughen up a bit in a couple of the areas if we hope to get
this past the Senate. And I am particularly concerned about the
deep seabed mining issue, although I think that there are significant
precedential implications for the new economic order as well as sig-
nificant interest in access to the minerals of the deep seabed. The
one thing that concerns me the most is that I am afraid that the
whole process is going to be lost if we do not insist on clear assured
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access to seabed minerals on our side of a balanced system. And I
believe there are a few other things that we could do on the charac-
ter of the economic zone and on marine scientific research as well,
although those issues are extremely difficult, and they are certainly
not amenable to simplistic solutions. Now going along with all of
this, we should avoid illegal unilateral claims. It should be a cardi-
nal tenet of United States oceans policy to avoid illegal unilateral-
ism in violation of our oceans freedom, yet we have just gone
through a period of making a 200-mile fishery zone claim that, in
my judgment, was illegal when made. We have just gone through
yet another process in which Senator Muskie and one of his staffers
forced through a claim over vessel source pollution in the Clean
Water Act Amendments - the section 311 problem; not only a
claim over 200 miles but in any area potentially affecting United
States resource jurisdiction. It looks like that claim has finally been
walked back with quiet amendment. I could give you two or three
more situations currently going on where domestic agencies are
pushing strongly for oceans activities in violation of the current
treaty obligations of the United States. Along with that we should
not merely avoid a unilateral illegal claim, but we should protest
the illegal claims of others that go beyond the kinds of things we
can accept. Obviously, we can not protest the 200-mile fishery zone
today, but we can certainly protest beyond that, and we can coordi-
nate with our allies to protest with a variety of oceans allies rather
than unilaterally; frankly on this point, I think we could even get
Soviet Union cooperation to protest systematically as well. What is
the record? We have not sent a protest note from the Department
of State on an oceans claim in recent years - an era which has seen
an expansion of 200-mile zones, not just with our fishery zone but
with many other claims that followed our claim, to the point where
today, eighty-five percent of all of the oceans areas that can be po-
tentially claimed to 200 miles has been claimed.
And finally, I think we need to strengthen the foreign policy
apparatus dealing with the coordination of oceans issues. I believe
it is commendable that the Department of State has set up the
Oceans Bureau though I would be somewhat happier if it were an
oceans and environment bureau rather than an oceans, environ-
ment, and science bureau. Why should the same bureau focus on
nuclear nonproliferation problems as well as oceans issues? Histor-
ically it was an accident, with the Department putting together
leftovers when the Bureau was created. The Defense Department
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is weak at the present time in oceans issues. They have very little
ability to focus on the issues though they have some extraordinarily
capable people. The National Security Council (NSC) has not a
single policy officer today focused on the question of oceans coordi-
nation, yet in past administrations they have. In this administra-
tion it fell to the wayside, I think, because the person who was in
charge went over to Mondale's staff, and also perhaps because Am-
bassador Richardson is such a strong personality that it was felt no
one was needed on the NSC to coordinate the policy on this area.
And finally, we should take a look at organization of domestic
oceans issues. Are we going to have an organizational arrangement
that will take into account the foreign policy aspects, or are we go-
ing to have a domestic organization that treats this area as Depart-
ment of Interior issues? I am sorry to say that the leaks all over
Washington indicate that the President's reorganization project will
be making a recommendation to fold the National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration (NOAA) into an enlarged Interior De-
partment to be called the Department of Resource Conservation or
some such thing. It is even unclear whether it will be splintered
within the Interior Department or whether NOAA will retain its
existence. I think such a move would be an enormous step back-
ward in the oceans area and that the right thing would be to estab-
lish an independent Oceans and Atmosphere Agency. One might
even adopt the recent recommendation of NACOA, the President's
Advisory Committee on Oceans that discussed adding to an in-
dependent Oceans and Atmosphere Agency the capability to deal
with polar areas and space, and combining NASA with it as well.
Such a suggestion has some attractive elements, though I can also
see some significant problems in getting NASA involved; I for one
would like to see the first step be an oceans and atmosphere agency.
Well, those are simply a few comments on what I think the
problems are and where I think we ought to go. For me the choice
is one between continuing to muddle through or adopting a coher-
ent foreign policy for the oceans.
Thank you.
2. The Conference has been deadlockedfor a number ofyears on
the deep seabed mining issue. Although your report on this issue is
optimistic, so have been the reports in the last two or three years.
*hat is the basis ofyour optimism, and don't you think it would be
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best to conclude a treaty on the basis of what has been agreed upon to
date, leaving the mining issue to be dealt with separately?
A. Your perception is accurate, I believe, when you say that the
report I have just given on the mining issue sounds very similar to
the report of one, two, and three years ago on the impasse reached
in this issue. I think the only major differences are that, first, there
has now been general agreement on an overall framework for the
negotiation on the mining issue. If it is a complex issue that has
thirty sub-elements, then how does one negotiate the specifics of
those articles that allow a serious effort at compromise before all
can agree on the overall framework? And yet what has happened
for the last two or three years is a shifting back and forth between
hard line demands for a single operating enterprise, demands on
the other hand for no enterprise at all, demands for a parallel sys-
tem, demands for a unitary joint venture system, or demands for
combinations of unitary joint venture systems with clean access sys-
tems, and so on. Until that fundamental framework problem was
resolved, it was impossible to go anywhere in the deep seabed min-
ing problem. Now I am somewhat optimistic, because at the last
session it seemed to me that the framework problem came closer to
resolution. There seems to be a more generalized, behind the
scenes understanding that we are going for a parallel or balanced
system. I am somewhat pessimistic, however, because I still see
forces from a variety of different directions that are trying to inter-
ject new conceptions about how to resolve the deep seabed prob-
lem; in my judgment, until the initial framework issue is resolved,
no progress will be made on the other.
Another thing that was fairly useful at the last session was the
procedural work. It went forward intelligently. We had a number
of different subcommittees. For the most part they did good work.
I think the finest example was that done by Ambassador Koh on
the financial arrangements, in which he worked out a detailed pro-
vision on the financing - the revenue-sharing - based on an
econometric model done at the Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy. And although we think the figures are high, I think the calibre
of the work is superb and generally the type of study, though in
need of some alterations, that deserves our strong support. So I see
some progress, and my sense is that Ambassador Richardson is
more encouraged by what happened at the last session as well.
Then the issue is whether one can speed it all up by splitting
off deep seabed mining and concluding the rest of it. Two points in
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response to that: first, there is a slight chance that it could be done.
Second, since there is a slight chance, it should be tried. And by
slight I think the chance is something like one in twenty that it
could be done. One of Ambassador Richardson's former negotia-
tors wrote an article in the Virginia Journal of International Law
urging the adoption of this proposal as the sole United States re-
sponse to the Law of the Sea impasse at the present time. I think it
is such a small chance that, although I would try it and certainly
float feelers to get reactions from conference leadership, the key is
to develop a package of amendments, a specific package on the
deep seabed text that illustrates precisely in the overall working of
the system what we must have to get it past the Senate. Then take
that package, coordinate it with our NATO allies - the kind of
action Secretary Habib says is always the automatic second step
and I agree completely - and also try to coordinate it with the
Soviets. At that point, behind the scenes and without ever surfac-
ing a draft, get conference acceptance of the overall package. I
think that is the way to proceed. It will be painful even if we do it
right, and it is likely to take two or three years.
Q. Traditionall, high seas resources, whether living or nonliving,
are considered res nullius. If these resources indeed belong to no one,
why cannot the United States simply proceed unilaterally to mine the
deep seabed?
A. I think there is one problem that differing persons think is
more or less overwhelming on the other side, that is, that most of
the rest of the world does not accept the United States claim that
every nation has a high seas right to mine the deep seabed. It is an
emperically observable fact that a strong majority of the world says
that is not the case. And whether you accept it merely as something
that is a political position on their part or whether you accept their
international legal claim, which I do not, it is likely that in time a
sustained effort to mine the deep seabed - solely by the United
States - without further agreement would lead to a variety of costs
which we would pay. Those costs might be to defense and security
interests through the breakdown of the overall law of the sea nego-
tiations. A pattern of systematic law suits against the assets around
the world of the companies involved, such as Kennecot or Lock-
heed, on a theory of theft of the common heritage of mankind
might result. It might simply result in increased political harrass-
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ment and difficulty in bilateral relations in some areas. But al-
though one can make differing assessments of the cost, it is fairly
clear that there would be costs. I think the real issue is, what are
our chances of concluding a good treaty that protects our interest in
deep seabed mining, because absent such a treaty we will mine uni-
laterally or with our allies, whatever the costs. I still think that if
we go about it right we have a good chance of concluding a treaty.
And by the way, I would at this time support passage of the deep
seabed mining legislation just as Ambassador Richardson is sup-
porting the passage of that legislation. In my judgment, it is not a
form of illegal unilateralism. We have consistently maintained our
right to do it. It is clearly interim. The legislation says we are min-
ing the deep seabed until such time as a comprehensive treaty is
adopted, and given the difficulty in the negotiation, I think the leg-
islation is on balance a risk worth taking in an effort to move the
conference from dead center.
18
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2 [1979], Art. 16
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol9/iss2/16
